load shedding routine

List of "A" group companies listed in NSE

	Nepal Stock Exchange Ltd.
	Classification of the Listed Companies under the Listing Bye-Law (2053)
	List of "A" Group company for the F/Y 2066/67
SN	Companies Name	Paid up Value	Book Value	No. of	Paidup Capital
		per share	(Rs) per share	shareholders	(Rs. in Million)
1	Nabil Bank Ltd.	100	324	8294	965.75
2	Nepal Investment Bank Ltd.	100	162	7591	2407.07
3	Standard Chartered Bank Ltd.	100	327.53	8882	1398.48
4	Himalayan Bank Ltd.	100	256.52	8432	1600.00
5	Nepal SBI Bank Limited	100	194.68	17657	1659.61
6	Everest Bank Ltd	100	262.71	15824	830.47
7	Bank of Kathmandu	100	206.25	21212	1182.16
8	Nepal Industrial And Co.Bank	100	145.57	34987	1140.48
9	Machhachapuchhre Bank Ltd	100	114.93	12778	1314.64
10	Laxmi Bank Limited	100	122.24	10628	1152.99
11	Kumari Bank Ltd	100	137	13671	1185.84
12	Siddhartha Bank Limited	100	124.56	37517	1571.13
13	NMB Bank Ltd.	100	111.75	16111	1430.00
14	KIST Bank Limited	100	102.26	5265	2000.00
15	DCBL Bank Ltd.	100	112.94	17063	1661.18
16	Nepal Finance and Saving Co.Ltd.	100	196.6	1342	30.00
17	NIDC Capital Markets Ltd.	100	167	1792	101.25
18	Narayani National Finance Co. Ltd. **	100	131.75	2405	431.06
19	Nepal Share Markets Ltd.	100	160.37	3235	432.00
20	Annapurna Finance Company Ltd	100	140.61	1581	262.08
21	Kathmandu Finance Limited.	100	161.72	2429	75.90
22	Peoples Finance Limited.	100	122.41	4533	202.10
23	Union Finance Ltd. *	100	120.33	5964	159.00
24	Citizen Investment Trust	100	256	4012	80.00
25	Nepal Aawas Bikas Beeta Co. Ltd.	100	137.15	3822	167.60
26	Gorkha Finance Ltd.	100	186.6	1631	59.50
27	Universal Finance Ltd.	100	134.97	2296	131.38
28	Maha Laxmi Finance Ltd.	100	138.78	1180	96.00
29	Lalitpur Finance Ltd. *	100	202.61	1010	170.79
30	Goodwill Finance Co. Ltd.	100	127.56	1314	115.47
31	Paschimanchal Finance Co. Ltd	100	172.29	1073	55.66
32	Lumbini Finance Ltd.	100	238.71	6230	90.00
33	Siddhartha Finance Limited	100	174.38	2326	86.93
34	Alpic Everest Finance Com Ltd	100	172.44	4610	78.00
35	United Finance Ltd	100	138.07	4731	165.00
36	International Leasing And Fin. Co.	100	119.33	5490	648.00
37	Shree Investment Finance Co. Ltd	100	255.27	2214	100.80
38	Central Finance Co. Ltd.	100	134.44	1854	145.98
39	Premier Finance Co. Ltd	100	123.68	1212	89.43
40	Nava Durga Finance Co.Ltd.	100	158.82	1108	45.59
41	Butwal Finance Ltd	100	157.21	1746	82.63
42	Standard Finance Ltd.	100	128.14	1871	1001.80
43	World Merchant Bank Ltd	100	157.98	1446	72.00
44	Birgunj Finance Ltd	100	226.25	1016	85.30
45	Capital Mer. Bank And Fin	100	107.34	1589	374.03
46	Prudential Bittiya Sans	100	112.28	1278	100.00
47	Royal Mer. Bank. And Fin	100	122.89	2268	147.68
48	Guheyshwori Mer. Bank. Fin *	100	125.75	1008	120.79
49	IME Financial Institution	100	126.2	1550	249.46
50	Imperial Financial Inst. Ltd. *	100	127.43	6482	50.00
51	Civil Merchant bittya sanstha	100	126.04	4399	50.00
52	ICFC Bittya Sanstha Ltd.	100	108.33	3991	329.38
53	Sagarmatha Mer. Banking & Fin. Ltd. *	100	142.83	8618	50.00
54	Reliable Finance Limited *	100	130.49	10050	82.50
55	Shikhar Bittiya Sanstha Limited *	100	121.39	9034	50.00
56	Nepal Express Finance Limited *	100	134.59	2782	104.00
57	Kuber Merchant Finance Limited *	100	124.66	7651	50.00
58	Prabhu Finance Company Limited *	100	106.98	9322	160.00
59	Soaltee Hotel Ltd. *	10	33.16	1593	95.67
60	Uniliver Nepal Ltd.	100	747.11	1405	92.07
61	Nepal Doorsanchar Company Limited *	100	277.53	32969	15000.00
62	National Hydro Power Co. *	100	100.15	6373	1385.19
63	Chilime Hydro power Co.	100	379.66	3668	729.60
64	National LifeInsu. Co.Ltd.	100	124.21	2378	132.00
65	Himalayan Gen.Insu. Co.Ltd.	100	133.35	1422	100.80
66	Everest Insurance Co. Ltd.	100	159.01	4912	101.25
67	Premier Insurance co. Ltd.	100	143.01	6438	102.00
68	Alliance Insurance Company Limited *	100	144.89	2360	59.99
69	Sagarmatha Insurance Co.Ltd	100	161.95	4522	102.10
70	Nepal Life Insurance Co. Ltd.	100	105.46	9124	300.00
71	Life Insurance Co. Nepal	100	116.17	9517	250.00
72	Lumbini General Insurance	100	101.86	10240	125.00
73	Shikhar Insurance Co. Ltd. *	100	114.89	2848	125.00
74	Siddhartha Insurance Limited	100	102.02	13665	100.00
75	Nirdhan Utthan Bank Ltd.	100	179.66	1685	79.07
76	Chhimek Vikash Bank Ltd.	100	174.67	2009	51.00
77	Infrastructure Development Bank Limited	100	122.02	6666	320.00
78	Gandaki Bikas Bank Limited	100	127	1285	100.00
79	Business Development Bank Ltd.	100	124.99	1780	565.70
80	Sanima Vikash Bank Ltd.	100	113.41	8046	768.00
81	Triveni Bikas Bank Limited *	100	152.93	6282	50.00
82	Purwanchal Grameen Bikash Bank Ltd *	100	130.46	10434	60.00
83	Bageshowori Dev.Bank *	100	150.92	2165	49.50
84	Sahayogi Vikas Bank	100	138.31	1303	36.00
85	Gurkha Development Bank	100	115.66	31933	528.00
86	Annapurna Bikash Bank Limited	100	105.32	4232	210.00
87	Swabalamwan Bikash Bank	100	376	1436	63.06
88	Ace Development Bank Limited	100	107.95	2324	750.46
89	Himchuli Bikash Bank Ltd.	100	130.98	7425	90.00
90	Malika Bikash Bank Limited *	100	135.51	3830	204.24
91	Siddhartha Development Bank Limited	100	102.69	2957	645.00
92	Biratlaxmi Bikash Bank Limited	100	160.36	7449	50.00
93	Excel Development Bank Ltd.	100	384.55	2106	80.00
94	Subhechha Bikas Bank Limited *	100	145.87	6369	40.00
Criteria for the classification of the listed companies as per Listing Bye-Laws 2053
1	The paid up capital of the company must be at least Rs. 20.00 million
2	The number of common share holders must be at least 1000
3	The company must have made the public floatation as per bye -laws 9 (Ka) sub bye laws (4)
4	The company must be in profit since last three years
5	The book value per share must not be less than its paid up value
6	Submission of the financial statement within six months from the closure of the fiscal year.
	* Companies added to category A
	** Companies Merged

NEPSE: Press Release (20101020)

Enlisted Companies suspended for not being renewed on time. Lists of those companies available on link below.
http://www.nepalstock.com/uploads/files/due%20listing%20payment%20%20of%20comp%2066_67.pdf

Intellectual Property Rights - 3

The Future of IPRs in the WTO

WTO members are on schedule as far as meeting deadlines set by the TRIPs agreement. Developed countries met their 1996 deadline, and almost all the developing nations completed implementation by their deadline, January 1, 2000. As part of implementation, WTO members have established laws protecting various forms of intellectual property, including copyrights, geographical indications, integrated circuit layouts and patents. They also have established formal judicial channels to enforce IPRs and legislated penalties to deter potential violations. WTO members have also created national intellectual property regimes that are controversial in that they involve substantial administrative changes and costs. Least-developed countries, have been granted an extended deadline; they must implement the agreement by 2005, but are exempt from applying patent protection to some pharmaceuticals until 2016.

With the recent agreement on pharmaceutical patents, WTO members have gotten TRIPs negotiations back on schedule, even though the Cancun talks ended prematurely. Technically, the agreement is considered to be an interim solution until WTO members modify the TRIPs agreements and successfully complete the Doha Round. Critics of the agreement will have a chance to improve the terms of the agreement as negotiations continue in Geneva.

IPRs also affect negotiations in agriculture and dispute settlement. The controversy over genetically modified foods and patents on life forms may become a divisive issue as agriculture negotiations progress. Also, recent regional trade agreements have begun formulating their own IPR enforcement rules, making dispute settlement more complicated as the WTO wades through the conflicting, and often vague, IPR regimes. General council meetings are scheduled throughout the first half of 2004 to try to accomplish what WTO members expected to achieve in Cancun. The outcome of those meetings will be a good indicator of how the Doha Round will proceed, and if WTO members will be able to conclude the round by its deadline in 2005.

Intellectual Property Rights - 2

The Debate on Relaxing IPRs

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), formed during the Uruguay Round, gives the WTO limited authority to enforce intellectual property rights (IPRs) and obligates member nations to enforce private IPRs. In negotiations to refine the agreement, the US has fought for even more strict enforcement of IPRs. The US argues that IPRs encourage innovation by protecting inventors' right to their creation for a limited amount of time and allowing them to reap the profits that make innovation worthwhile. The US trade representative's firm stance on IPRs seems largely in line with powerful commercial lobbies, such as the pharmaceutical industry. Because of its large lobby power, the pharmaceutical industry has been able influence the WTO agreement that relaxed drug IPRs through the US's negotiating stance. The pharmaceutical industry has traditionally resisted these agreements because it is concerned that vagueness in the language could allow countries to abuse patent exemptions. While the pharmaceutical lobby is quick to defend the right of countries to produce generic drugs for public health reasons, it argues that profitable 'lifestyle' or luxury drugs such as Viagra and weight-loss drugs could be included under patent exemption via loopholes in the wording of the agreement.[3] To assuage these fears, the US introduced a 'public, non-commercial' use clause that WTO members agreed to add, and many developed nations pledged to never use patent exemptions unless in the case of an emergency. Other developed nations with a strong pharmaceutical lobbying force, such as the EU, agree with the US's concerns, but have been quicker to compromise than the US.

A broad spectrum of players argue in favor of loosening intellectual property rights in the interest of increasing global access to patented pharmaceuticals. Especially in light of the African AIDS epidemic, and persisting epidemics of tuberculosis, dengue fever, malaria, and typhoid in other developing countries, it is vital that these countries have access to more affordable drugs. Some also add to this argument that patent protection actually reduces innovation and invention by limiting competition. Many NGOs link the debate over patent exemption to larger divisions between the rich and poor nations, arguing that patent protections reinforce inequality in the world.

Some public health analysts have voiced their concern that the debate on intellectual property rights and public health distracts from more important problems that limit access to health care in developing countries. They argue that to improve public health, developing countries need help improving access to health services, increasing health education, eliminating corruption and inefficiency, and improving sanitation within the country.

Intellectual Property Rights - 1

Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have become synonymous with the debate on generic drug production and trade. After discussions over patent exemptions reached an impasse at the end of 2002 WTO members scrambled to come to some agreement in time for the Cancun Ministerial Meeting. The prospects looked bleak after members missed their deadline for an agreement on developing countries' access to essential drugs. By the end of August 2003, trade delegates supported an agreement that allowed developing countries to import generic drugs for the treatment of diseases that are public health threats.[1] While the agreement is heralded as a success because it addresses a major concern of small developing countries, some criticize the agreement for adding red-tape for developing countries who want to file for a patent exemption.

Agreement on Pharmaceutical Patent Exemptions

The Agreement on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on IPRs enables developing countries to import a generic drug if they can provide evidence of the public health concern, demonstrate the inability of the domestic pharmaceutical industry to produce the drug itself, and prove that it will only use the drug for public, non-commercial purposes. Developing countries are satisfied that the agreement does not limit them to emergency situations or designate only a short list of diseases for which generic drugs can be produced. Instead, it permits them to produce or import drugs to address the particular diseases that affect their countries.

NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontiéres, Oxfam, and Third World Network have criticized the agreement for adding more bureaucratic burdens to the process of issuing compulsory licenses.[2] These NGOs argue that the obstacles of proof will fall on developing countries who scarcely have the time, money, or other resources to present their case before the WTO. Furthermore, it is unclear how developing countries who want to import generic drugs could prove that their domestic pharmaceutical industry is unable to satisfy domestic demand. The primary concern is that the WTO will only approve import requests from countries that lack domestic industries altogether and reject requests based on the inefficiency of domestic industry. Lastly, the distinction that generic drugs may only produced for "public, non-commercial purposes" is vague and open for contention. Some NGOs argue that it will be impossible to stimulate the production of affordable generic drugs if there is no economic incentives.

Intellectual Property Rights - 1

Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have become synonymous with the debate on generic drug production and trade. After discussions over patent exemptions reached an impasse at the end of 2002 WTO members scrambled to come to some agreement in time for the Cancun Ministerial Meeting. The prospects looked bleak after members missed their deadline for an agreement on developing countries' access to essential drugs. By the end of August 2003, trade delegates supported an agreement that allowed developing countries to import generic drugs for the treatment of diseases that are public health threats.[1] While the agreement is heralded as a success because it addresses a major concern of small developing countries, some criticize the agreement for adding red-tape for developing countries who want to file for a patent exemption.

Agreement on Pharmaceutical Patent Exemptions

The Agreement on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on IPRs enables developing countries to import a generic drug if they can provide evidence of the public health concern, demonstrate the inability of the domestic pharmaceutical industry to produce the drug itself, and prove that it will only use the drug for public, non-commercial purposes. Developing countries are satisfied that the agreement does not limit them to emergency situations or designate only a short list of diseases for which generic drugs can be produced. Instead, it permits them to produce or import drugs to address the particular diseases that affect their countries.

NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontiéres, Oxfam, and Third World Network have criticized the agreement for adding more bureaucratic burdens to the process of issuing compulsory licenses.[2] These NGOs argue that the obstacles of proof will fall on developing countries who scarcely have the time, money, or other resources to present their case before the WTO. Furthermore, it is unclear how developing countries who want to import generic drugs could prove that their domestic pharmaceutical industry is unable to satisfy domestic demand. The primary concern is that the WTO will only approve import requests from countries that lack domestic industries altogether and reject requests based on the inefficiency of domestic industry. Lastly, the distinction that generic drugs may only produced for "public, non-commercial purposes" is vague and open for contention. Some NGOs argue that it will be impossible to stimulate the production of affordable generic drugs if there is no economic incentives.